Journal of
Marketing Development and Competitiveness
Scholar Gateway
Abstracts prior to volume 5(1) have been archived!Issue 5(1), October 2010 -- Paper AbstractsGirard (p. 9-22)Cooper (p. 23-32)Kunz-Osborne (p. 33-41)Coulmas-Law (p.42-46)Stasio (p. 47-56)Albert-Valette-Florence (p.57-63)Zhang-Rauch (p. 64-70)Alam-Yasin (p. 71-78)Mattare-Monahan-Shah (p. 79-94)Nonis-Hudson-Hunt (p. 95-106) 
JOURNAL OF APPLIED BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
New Constitutional “Debt Brakes” for Euroland Revisited
Author(s): John D. Merrifield, Barry W. Poulson
Citation: John D. Merrifield, Barry W. Poulson, (2017) "New Constitutional “Debt Brakes” for Euroland Revisited," Journal of Applied Business and Economics, Vol. 19, Iss.8, pp. 110-132
Article Type: Research paper
Publisher: North American Business Press
Abstract:
Mause and Groeteke (2012) challenge the view that new constitutional debt brakes are needed to prevent fiscal crises and bailouts in Europe1. In this study, we expand on their public choice framework to explore the effectiveness of debt brakes for fiscal stabilization. We focus on two case studies, Switzerland and Germany. The institutions of direct democracy and fiscal federalism have not empowered German citizens as they have citizens in Switzerland. If these institutional differences explain the effectiveness of the debt brakes enacted in European countries, this poses a greater challenge than is suggested by Mause and Groeteke.
