JOURNAL OF APPLIED BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Security Analyst Monitoring
Activity, and Firm Value
Author(s): Sheryl-Ann K. Stephen, Vincent P. Apilado
Citation: Sheryl-Ann K. Stephen, Vincent P. Apilado, (2013) "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Security Analyst Monitoring Activity, and Firm Value," Journal of Applied Business and Economics, Vol. 14, Iss. 1, pp. 86-98
Article Type: Research paper
Publisher: North American Business Press
Abstract:
In this study we examine the complementary monitoring activity that takes place via the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) and its effect on security analyst monitoring activity and firm value of large and small public
firms. Our findings indicate that security analyst monitoring activity has decreased post-SOX while firm
value has increased post-SOX for both large and small firms. We also find that the increase in firm value
is more pronounced for the group of small firms. Given these results, we surmise that the complementary
monitoring activity provided by SOX is effective enough to have a positive impact on firm value.