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JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE
The Effects of Equity Ownership and Compensation on Executive Departure
Author(s): Daniel Ames
Citation: Daniel Ames, (2011) "The Effects of Equity Ownership and Compensation on Executive Departure" Vol. 11, Iss. 2, pp. 11 - 15
Article Type: Research paper
Publisher: North American Business Press
Abstract:
Building on the work of Coles, Lemmon, Naveen (2003), this study examines the executive departure of
CEOs and other executives during periods of private equity ownership and public equity ownership. I find
that executive departure is significantly more likely during periods of private ownership than during
periods of public ownership. However, this effect is limited to non-CEOs. I also find that the level of
variable compensation paid to executives impacts executive tenure. Specifically, larger bonuses are
associated with a decreased probability of departure the following year. This is the case for CEOs as well
as other executives.
